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TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAX-STATUS OF PAYMENT OF CORPORATE
LIABILITY BY STOCKHOLDER SuBSEQUE.NT To LIQUIDATION-Petitioners, from
1937 to 1940, received distributions from the liquidation of a corporation of
which they were stockholders and reported the profits thus obtained, classifying
them as capital gains pursuant to I.R.C., §115. In 1944, a judgment was rendered against the corporation. Petitioners, as transferees, paid the judgment and
took a deduction of 100 per cent, classifying the amount paid as an ordinary
business loss.1 The Commissioner took a contrary position, and held the payment a capital loss.2 The Tax Court upheld the petitioners' contention3 but the
court of appeals reversed.4 On appeal, held, affirmed, three Justices dissenting.
The payment should be viewed as a part of the original liquidation transaction
requiring classification as a capital loss. Arrowsmith and Bauer v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, (U.S. 1952) 73 S.Ct. 71.
Prior to the judicial introduction of the taxable year concept into the tax
law of the United States, when a taxpayer received distributions from the
liquidation of a corporation in one year and in a subsequent year had to pay a
liability of that corporation, the proper treatment was to reopen his earlier return
and adjust the gain there reported. 5 However, in 1932, as a corollary to the

Under I.R.C., §23(a).
Applying I.R.C., §§ll7(b), (d)(2), and (e).
3 Bauer v. Commisioner, 15 T.C. 876 (1950).
4 Commissioner v. Arrowsmith, (2d Cir. 1952) 193 F. (2d) 734.
5 Appeal of Barker, 3 B.T.A. 1180 (1926); O'Neal v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 1036
(1930).
1
2
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development of the "claim of right" doctrine,6 the Supreme Court developed
the taxable year concept under which subsequent payment of a contingent liability was treated as a loss in the year it was paid, and not as reducing income
for the year in which the liability accrued. 7 The justification for the rule was
found in administrative necessity in the levying and collection of taxes,8 and,
since its adoption, it has become well established that each year should stand
alone for tax accounting purposes in these cases.9 In 1941 the Tax Court
determined that the taxable year concept applied to situations like the principal
case and overruled the earlier decisions by holding that the loss should be
reported in the year it was paid.10 In the principal case it was argued on behalf
of petitioners that the taxable year concept should be applied to foreclose consideration of the past liquidation transaction as was done in an earlier Third
Circuit decision.11 The majority, in declining to follow the Third Circuit decision, rests on a sound logical distinction in that the question in the principal
case is not in what accounting period the loss should be returned-the question
to which the taxable year doctrine is directed-but whether the loss should be
characterized as ordinary or capital. The application of the taxable year concept
to foreclose consideration of past events to determine the nature of a loss or gain
would be a considerable extension of the concept. That the court will consider
past transactions to determine the nature of a loss or gain despite the taxable
year concept was indicated in the case of Commissioner v. Dobson.12 Despite
the distinction drawn by the majority, the question still remains whether it
would not have been better to extend the tax year doctrine to cover this type of
case. The majority argue that petitioners' position should be no different from
what it would be if they had paid the obligation in the earlier year, in which
case it would have been a capital loss. This argument, however, ignores the
fact that had they paid it in that year, they would have had a capital gain

6 North American Oil Co. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 52 S.Ct. 613 (1932), where the
Court held that earnings received under a claim of right in one year should be treated as
income earned in that year (regardless of any contingent liability to return all or part at
some time in the future).
7 North American Oil Co. v. Burnet, note 6 supra; Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co.,
282 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 150 (1931).
s Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., note 7 supra. _
9 United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590, 71 S.Ct. 522 (1951); Security Flour Mills
Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281, 64S.Ct. 596 (1944). See also annotation, 154 AL.R.
1276 (1945).
lOFurlong v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 362 (1941); Estate of Mills v. Commissioner,
4 T.C. 820 (1945).
11 Commissioner v. Switlik, (3d Cir. 1950) 184 F. (2d) 299.
12 320 U.S. 489, 64 S.Ct. 239 (1943). For other cases in which the courts have
looked to past transactions to determine the nature of a loss or gain, see Westover v. Smith,
(9th Cir. 1949) 173 F. (2d) 90; and Commissioner v. Carter, (2d Cir. 1948) 170 F.
(2d) 911. In these cases distnoutions made to taxpayers upon liquidation included contract
rights to royalties, to which no value was assigned in the returns for the year of liquidation.
Payments received in subsequent years were held to be capital gains and not ordinary
income, being treated as a part of the earlier liquidation transaction.
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against which they could set off the entire loss. If, however, they have no capital
gain in the year they pay the loss or in the ensuing four years, they would be
able to deduct only $5,000.18 In support of the majority, however, it may be
argued that to hold otherwise would be to place a premium on miscalculating
the corporate obligations upon liquidation. To decide the case either way on
the basis of equities is a difficult proposition, either alternative yielding some
undesirable consequences. Perhaps it should be noted that the inequity in
deciding against petitioners is not so much caused by the failure to apply the
taxable year concept as it is by the application of that concept to foreclose
readjustment of the prior years' returns. The conclusion of the majority in the
principal case, while not completely satisfactory, is at least based on a sound
distinction, and is as just as any result could be as long as the single accounting
year principle is accepted.
George V. Burbach, S.Ed.

18 Under I.R.C., §ll7(d)(2), loss from sales or exchanges of capital assets are allowed
only to the extent of capital gains plus $1000. Sec. 117(e) provides that there shall be a
capital loss carry-over into the :five succeeding years.

